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SHARPENING THE CUTTING EDGE OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF WAR  
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 
Daniel Kanstroom*
Abstract: International criminal tribunals have emerged as the most tan-
gible and well-known mechanism for seeking justice in the wake of atro-
cious human rights violations. As the enterprise has developed, the need 
to ask fundamental questions is obvious, compelling, and essential. In 
March, 2006, the Boston College International and Comparative Law Re-
view, together with The Center for Human Rights and International Jus-
tice at Boston College and the Owen M. Kupferschmid Holocaust/Human 
Rights Project convened a diverse and impressive group of speakers from 
academia, the judiciary, and legal practice to evaluate: the development 
of “common law” of the tribunals, the function and limits of tribunals, 
and the state of legal concepts not clearly governed by international law. 
Much of the extended conversation of that day is contained in this pub-
lished version, comprising eight articles. From the participants’ insights 
one can discern not only important new ideas and syntheses, but an out-
line for future research that is grounded in a deep respect for the broad 
human rights enterprise of which the tribunals are the “cutting edge.” 
 For better or worse, international criminal tribunals have emerged 
as the most tangible and well-known mechanism for seeking justice in 
the wake of atrocious human rights violations. If they accomplish their 
ostensible goals, international tribunals may render justice to the ac-
cused, sustain the rule of law, give voice to victims, promote reconcilia-
tion, create a record, empower communities, resolve factual disputes, 
and ensure that grave war crimes do not go unpunished. They offer 
tantalizing promises of legitimacy, regularity, and predictability as they 
work to achieve goals common to all systems of criminal law—just pun-
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director, International Human Rights Program, Bos-
ton College Law School. This article is an overview of the articles published in this issue 
that were based on speeches and panel discussions presented at “Sharpening the Cutting 
Edge of International Human Rights Law: Unresolved Issues of War Crimes Tribunals,” a 
symposium on war crimes tribunals at the Boston College Law School on March 24, 2006. 
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ishment, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, and rehabilita-
tion.1
 But criminal law is a blunt instrument at best, even in domestic 
legal systems. Its purposes are difªcult to synthesize and therefore its 
achievements are elusive to evaluate.2 No single normative theory 
works to justify all criminal doctrines, nor should it.3 In operation, 
criminal law often masks complicated interpretive constructs.4 Those 
who practice criminal law, as I did for many years, repeatedly see the 
wisdom of the maxim that when one’s only tool is a hammer, all prob-
lems tend to look like nails.5
 Following the death of Slobodan Milosevic in custody and mid-trial 
at the Hague and the grotesque spectacles of Saddam Hussein ªrst 
mocking the criminal justice system he faced and then being taunted 
by his executioners as he faced the gallows, the need to ask hard, fun-
damental questions about the current state of war crimes tribunals is 
obvious. Moreover, as the enterprise has developed through the prodi-
gious efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and many 
other tribunals, a welter of more speciªc legal questions have arisen. 
 In March 2006, the Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review, together with The Center for Human Rights and In-
ternational Justice at Boston College and the Owen M. Kupferschmid 
Holocaust/Human Rights Project, convened a diverse and impressive 
group of speakers from academia, the judiciary, and legal practice to 
evaluate the following related issues: 
1. The development of “common law” of the tribunals: How might 
various legal standards at different tribunals be reconciled and 
evaluated? How much uniformity should be sought? What are 
                                                                                                                      
1 Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 19, 19 (1988). 
2 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 
401 (1958) (“Examination of the purposes commonly suggested for the criminal law will 
show that each of them is complex and that none may be thought of as wholly excluding 
the others . . . . The problem, accordingly, is one of the priority and relationship of pur-
poses as well as of their legitimacy . . . .”). 
3 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 269, 350 (1996). 
4 See generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
Stan. L. Rev. 591 (1981). 
5 So far as I am aware, the exact origins of this formulation are unclear. It is frequently 
attributed—without precise citation—to Mark Twain and, more recently, to Abraham 
Maslow. 
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the implications of such “common law” development for in-
ternational human rights law more generally? 
2. The function and limits of the tribunals: What are the optimal pur-
poses of trials when massive human rights abuses have de-
stroyed a community or indeed an entire country? How have 
the tribunals measured up in that regard? How does one rec-
oncile forensic legal practice with the needs of victims? What 
multi-disciplinary models can be developed to move interna-
tional criminal practice towards a more holistic approach? 
3. The state of legal concepts not clearly governed by international law: 
What are the professional ethical standards that govern the tri-
bunals? What is the law of competency, the scope of attorney-
client privilege, self-representation, the breadth of the protec-
tion against self-incrimination, et cetera? 
 The results of this Symposium were a series of well-reasoned, 
deeply-engaged, and lively discussions. Fortunately, much of the ex-
tended conversation of that day is contained in this published version. 
From the participants’ insights one can discern not only important new 
ideas and syntheses, but an outline for future research that is grounded 
in a deep respect for the broad human rights enterprise of which the 
tribunals are the “cutting edge” (an intentional double entendre imply-
ing both a surgical and a destructive capacity). 
 Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement to the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal offers a good starting point for consideration of these topics. 
Jackson said, “The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have 
been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization 
cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their be-
ing repeated.”6 He then focused attention on the fact that, “four great 
nations, ºushed with victory and stung with injury stay[ed] the hand of 
vengeance and voluntarily submit[ted] their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law.”7 This triumph of law over cruder mechanisms 
was, he said, “one of the most signiªcant tributes that Power has ever 
paid to Reason.”8
 These are surely among the most famous, aspirational, and ringing 
words ever spoken in a courtroom or indeed anywhere. They retain the 
                                                                                                                      
6 Robert H. Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address of Nov. 21, 1945, 2 Trial of the Major 
War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 98–99 (1947) [hereinaf-
ter Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address]. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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power to move and inspire me every time I read them. But one might 
also note an odd similarity between Jackson’s phrasing of “Power” pay-
ing tribute to “Reason” and that of La Rochefoucauld,9 who wrote, four 
centuries earlier, words with which Robert Jackson was surely familiar: 
“hypocrisy is a tribute that vice pays to virtue.”10
 Jackson was in fact called a hypocrite in his day—not only by Nazis 
but by believers in the rule of law such as Chief Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone, who called Nuremberg “a high-grade lynching party” and, more 
to our point, said, “I don’t mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to 
see the pretense that he is running a court and proceeding according 
to common law . . . .”11 Many others also opposed the Nuremberg 
idea—Churchill, as is well-known, suggested shooting the captured 
Nazi leaders. A memo written in support of this proposition was enti-
tled—with classic British understatement— “The Argument for Summary 
Process Against Hitler & Co.”12
 Is this debate now deªnitively over? War was famously called the 
extension of politics by other means by Carl von Clausewitz.13 War 
crimes are the illegal extension of war by illegitimate means or to le-
gally-protected people. How do—and how should—international tri-
bunals draw such lines? To what extent do the tribunals embody, re-
ºect, and recreate legitimate law and to what extent do they create 
new law? Are they a tribute paid by power to reason or a hypocritical 
homage paid by vice to virtue? 
 The ªrst panel of the Symposium addressed the question of “The 
Development of the Common Law of the Tribunals.” This undoubtedly 
seemed an odd title to some. After all, the common law is fundamen-
tally an Anglo-American idea, and even there it is largely anachronistic 
in the era of the administrative state. Anyone with even a passing 
knowledge of tribunals as varied as those for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Sierra Leone, and the ICC would certainly wonder about how much 
                                                                                                                      
9 François VI, duc de La Rochefoucauld, le Prince de Marcillac (1613–80). 
10 “L’hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertu.” La Rochefoucauld, Fran-
cois, duc de. Maxims, maxim 219, at 43 (Stuart D. Warner & Stéphane Douard eds., 2001) 
(translation by author). 
11 Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 716 (1956). 
12 Great Britain Pub. Records Ofªce (PRO), Kew, London: CAB 66/65, W.P. (45) 281, 
Simon memorandum, War Criminals: Annex B: The Argument for Summary Process 
against Hitler & Co., May 3, 1945; cited in Gary J. Bass, International Law: War Crimes and the 
Limits of Legalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2103, 2103 n.1 (1999). 
13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 1976) 
(“We maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addi-
tion of other means.”). 
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common law there is. Indeed, the most famous explication of the 
common law highlighted the importance of a common history, perhaps 
even a common sense of nationhood: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience 
. . . . The law embodies the story of a nation’s development 
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it 
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it 
has been, and what it tends to become.14
 What has the law of the tribunals been? What does it tend to be-
come? Which nation’s or nations’ story does it embody? It was in this 
broad, legal realist sense that we asked our panelists to explore the 
“cutting edge” of international human rights law. The hope was that we 
might be at a point where one could improve upon the candid assess-
ment of one panelist, Pierre Prosper, who had served with great distinc-
tion as a prosecutor at the United Nations International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda. Describing his experiences in Rwanda, Prosper 
conceded: “We made it up as we went along. We really did.” 
 In her article for this Symposium, Judge Patricia M. Wald,15 who 
served for two decades on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and then as a judge at the ICTY, notes that the 
legitimacy of international courts depends in large measure upon 
their adherence to a complex body of international law. For criminal 
tribunals, this means an array of treaties, such as the Hague and Ge-
neva Conventions and Protocols, but it also means “customary law.” 
Thus, the development of a common law for the tribunals is both a 
matter of textual interpretation and a still more amorphous process. 
Major differences among the tribunals themselves render the process 
of developing a consistent common law particularly complicated. The 
Rwanda Tribunal, for example, deals with terrible crimes committed 
during and after a civil war. The ICC has a much broader mandate 
and a comprehensive treaty.16 Judge Wald notes with approval recent 
                                                                                                                      
14 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law 1 (1881). 
15 Patricia M. Wald, Tribunal Discourse and Intercourse: How the International Courts Speak 
to One Another, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 15 (2007). 
16 Indeed, as Judge Wald notes, Article 21 of the Rome Statute mandates a hierarchy of 
interpretive sources: the Statute, Elements, and Rules come ªrst; followed by treaties and 
principles or rules of international law; general principles of law derived from national 
systems, if not inconsistent with the statute or international principles; and, ªnally, its own 
prior decisions. Id. at 17. 
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attempts to better understand and to systematize customary humani-
tarian law.17 At the ICTY, the identiªcation of customary law (or its 
absence) was signiªcant in matters ranging from the nexus between 
crimes against humanity and armed conºict to the need for discrimi-
natory intent as an element of all crimes against humanity (not only 
persecution); and whether duress is a defense to killing innocent civil-
ians or limited to a mitigating factor in punishment. But she also 
notes that the enterprise has a long way to go. The crux of the dispute 
involves an issue about which American legal scholars and politicians 
continually argue: when does a court simply interpret or apply exist-
ing law and when does it “legislate” or create new law? 
 In the second section of her article, Judge Wald analyzes a more 
subtle, but equally important question: the myriad of less formal rules 
and practices, beyond formal judgments. Here, the legal realism at the 
heart of her approach clearly emerges. She notes how sources of “soft” 
law and practice “have been indispensable to the survival of the ICTY 
and ICTR, and have been intensively mined by more recently estab-
lished courts for ‘best practices’ replication.”18 Indeed, she suggests 
that prosecutorial norms and guidelines may turn out to be even more 
inºuential in the overall record of these courts than the jurispru-
dence.19 In the end, the problem of how all of this common law may be 
understood and controlled is a vexing one. As Judge Wald highlights, 
there can be no doubt that “tribunal law has exploded quantitatively 
and qualitatively.”20 But, unlike national courts, international courts are 
not embedded within a hierarchical judicial system. 
 At present, for the most part, though one sees many informal 
routes of convergence, “one court’s jurisprudence must rely on the 
persuasiveness of its reasoning, supplemented by the critiques of aca-
demics and international law scholars, if it is to be picked up by other 
courts.”21 As she observes, this pathway is analogous to the transforma-
tion of common law into statutory law in the United States. But, as the 
tribunal enterprise devolves in favor of the ICC, one wonders “where 
the grist for its mill will come from—the percolation process may have 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 817 
(2005). 
18 Wald, supra note 15, at 20. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 23. 
21 Judge Wald also notes how the ICC drafters “have cherry-picked what seemed to 
them the best rulings and practices from the earlier courts and discarded those that did 
not meet their standard.” See id. at 25. 
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largely dried up.”22 Judge Wald offers what I believe is a prescient and 
important cautionary note about the dangers of a “monopoly jurispru-
dence.” As she concludes, “academics and court watchers will have to 
be especially vigilant and productive” to help the ICC fulªll its mission. 
 As Holmes noted, in order to know what the common law is, we 
must know what it has been. To this end, the articles by Devin O. Pen-
das, a historian, and Allan A. Ryan, a lawyer, are especially instructive.23 
Pendas highlights the modern development of the “legalist paradigm,” 
a term he borrows from Michael Walzer and upon which he elaborates 
in subtle and important ways. Pendas argues that the emergence of a 
“full legalist paradigm” following World War II fundamentally trans-
formed the relationship between law and war. But why, he asks, did it 
suddenly make sense to think about the conduct of war as a potentially 
criminal enterprise that could actually be prosecuted? His answer is that the 
development was not, as some have assumed, an apotheosis of human 
rights reasoning in the wake of the Holocaust, but was also largely a re-
sponse to the “breakdown of a long-standing civilizational consensus 
among European Elites.”24 As Pendas writes, this civilizational consen-
sus, “rested on the assumption that there was an intrinsic connection 
between the nation-state form—deªned legally by the doctrine of sov-
ereignty . . . and the practice and protection of ‘civilized’ norms of both 
internal and international conduct.”25 Outside of this consensus was 
“barbarism,” a frequently racialized concept, seen to be an attribute 
primarily of pre-state peoples.26 International law primarily governed 
the relationships between, but not within, “civilized” nation-states.27 
This ideal of civilization “delimited what it was that the international 
law of war needed to regulate. . . . Far from there being any provision 
for dealing with the reciprocal entanglement of state and individual 
criminality, there was a radical disjuncture between the two.”28
 The post-World War II “legalist paradigm” was clearly different. 
Pendas is skeptical that it was solely the revelation of the Holocaust that 
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. at 26. 
23 Devin Pendas, “The Magical Scent of the Savage”: Colonial Violence, The Crisis of Civiliza-
tion, and the Origins of the Legalist Paradigm of War, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 29 (2007); 
Allan A. Ryan, Nuremberg’s Contributions to International Law, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
55 (2007). 
24 Pendas, supra note 23, at 38. 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Ter-
ror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (1998). 
27 Pendas, supra note 23, at 38–39. 
28 Id. at 39. 
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led to Nuremberg.29 For one thing, “while the Holocaust was hardly 
ignored completely at Nuremberg or in the successor trials, it was 
hardly central either.”30 Second, the new legalist paradigm also sup-
ported a series of trials conducted in East Asia.31 Thus, he concludes, 
the 1945 legalist paradigm was not a uniquely European phenomenon, 
and did not originate solely in the experience of Nazi genocide. 
 Nor can it simply be described as a product of the rise of a Univer-
salist human rights culture in opposition to strong notions of state sov-
ereignty. As Pendas notes, “a doctrine as venerable and self-interested 
as state sovereignty does not succumb easily.”32 The Holocaust, he ar-
gues, culminated thirty years of European crisis. German “barbarism” 
seemed to vindicate the worst assessments of pessimists ranging from 
Conrad to Spengler. Civilization seemed to provide an inadequate 
moral check on sovereign states, even “civilized” ones. This insight pro-
vides a unique gloss on Jackson’s invocation of “wrongs which we seek 
to condemn” because “civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, 
because it cannot survive their being repeated.”33 Thus, Pendas, notes, 
“Even when the Holocaust was used to justify the emerging legalist 
paradigm after World War II, what was relevant was not the killing but 
the ‘civilized’ status of the killers.”34 The horrors experienced from 
1914 to 1945 taught Europeans “lessons they had hitherto been unwill-
ing to learn from their own conduct of colonial wars around the world” 
about the brutal capacity of the modern nation-state to violate human 
rights on a massive scale.35 As Pendas (rather challengingly) concludes, 
“the legalist paradigm of war . . . emerged as a mode of redemption . . . 
little less than [a] last-chance gamble on the durability of civilization in 
the face of its own undeniable barbaric tendencies.”36
                                                                                                                      
29 He notes that “the unprecedented character of Nazi atrocities made anything less 
than an unprecedented response seem trivial and inadequate.” Id. 
30 Id. (citing Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust at Nuremberg, in 26 Yad Vashem Studies 
4–45 (David Silberklang ed., 1998)). 
31 Id. at 40 (citing generally Timothy P. Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War 
Crimes Trials (2001); Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War 
Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 (1979); Richard H. Minear, Victor’s Jus-
tice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971)). 
32 Pendas, supra note 23, at 43. 
33 Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address, supra note 6, at 98–99. 
34 Pendas, supra note 23, at 44. 
35 See, e.g., Helmut Walser Smith, The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of Miscegenation: Notes 
on Debates in the German Reichstag Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904–1914, in The Imperial-
ist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy 107–23 (Sara Friedrichsmeyer et 
al. eds., 1998). 
36 Pendas, supra note 23, at 53. 
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 Allan Ryan highlights the legal importance of the Nuremberg 
precedent that under-girds the current tribunals. The importance of 
Nuremberg, he writes, “lies chieºy in what the process ordained.”37 As 
“the ªrst true trial for violations of human rights,” Nuremberg served 
“as the bridge from the traditional law of war to the law of human 
rights that marked the latter half of the twentieth century.”38 Thus, 
suggests Ryan, Nuremberg “changed forever the presumptions of na-
tional sovereignty, individual responsibility, and personal accountabil-
ity that had underlain international law since the rise of nation-states 
three centuries before.”39
 Ryan highlights the major features of the Nuremberg model: the 
Charter of the Tribunal explicitly held individuals, including the lead-
ers of an enemy nation, accountable under international law for their 
actions; it deªned a new category of crime— “crimes against human-
ity” —to overcome traditional limitations of international law; and it 
governed crimes that Germany had taken against its own citizens—an 
arena that hitherto was widely considered beyond the reach of interna-
tional law.40 It took half a century for the Nuremberg precedent to be 
much more than an isolated episode. With the end of the Cold War, 
however, the United Nations focused on the horrors of Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, and attention turned to Nuremberg for its model. Ryan’s arti-
cle highlights the fact that Nuremberg was far from inevitable. Indeed, 
it arose from an intensely political domestic and international process. 
As Ryan writes, “There was no precedent, no list of crimes to be 
charged, no guide as to how four different nations should proceed, and 
often no consensus on the purpose of the trial or what was to be 
achieved.”41 His article thus offers Nuremberg as an evolutionary prece-
dent, an exemplar of how tribunal law may develop. Consider the con-
troversy over the proposal to base the trials on conspiracy charges—a 
uniquely Anglo-American approach that had previously not been 
thought of as an international crime.42 Questions about the propriety 
of conspiracy charges at the tribunals remain quite vital to this day. 
Similarly, debates over legitimacy and the common law from that pe-
riod retain relevance. As Ryan notes, many in the U.S. legal community, 
troubled by the scope and nature of the crimes addressed by Nurem-
                                                                                                                      
37 Ryan, supra note 23, at 55. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 55–56. 
41 Id. at 56. 
42 Ryan, supra note 23, at 61. 
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berg, struggled to adapt existing law to the task of redressing them. As 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a “driving force for war 
crimes policy in Stimson’s War Department” put it: 
In texture and application, this law will be novel because the 
scope of the Nazi activity has been broad and ruthless with-
out precedent. The basic principles to be applied, however, 
are not novel . . . . International law must develop to meet 
the needs of the times just as the common law has grown, 
not by enunciating new principles but by adapting old ones 
. . . .43
 But the rub, of course, is the question of where adaptation ends 
and innovation begins. When Robert Jackson pushed for novel charges 
of aggressive war, he recognized this clearly. As Ryan notes, Jackson did 
not and could not pretend that the trial would be applying well-settled 
principles. Jackson’s view was much more ºuid: 
International [l]aw is . . . an outgrowth of treaties or agree-
ments between nations and of accepted customs . . . we can-
not deny that our own day has its right to institute customs 
and to conclude agreements that will themselves become 
sources of a newer and strengthened International Law.44
 Of course, as Telford Taylor recognized, when it came to prose-
cuting aggressive launching of a war, the more realistic conclusion was 
that, “the thing we want to accomplish is not a legal thing but a politi-
cal thing.”45 Nevertheless, Ryan concludes that the intensely political 
Nuremberg process, which was “juridical in its execution,” renovated 
international law, and may even be said to have, in large measure, 
created human rights law.46
 But how well does the criminal model embody the essence of hu-
man rights law? What are the functions and limits of tribunals? Donald 
L. Hafner, a political scientist, and Elizabeth B. L. King, a lawyer, grap-
                                                                                                                      
43 Memorandum to Judge Rosenman From Lord Simon (Lord Chancellor) (April 6, 
1945), in The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record 1944–1945, 
at 161 (Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982); see Ryan, supra note 23, at 65. 
44 Robert H. Jackson, Atrocities and War Crimes: Report from Robert H. Jackson to the Presi-
dent, 12 Department of State Bulletin 1071, 1076 (1945); see Ryan, supra note 23, at 69. 
45 Telford Taylor, An Approach to the Preparation of the Prosecution of Axis Criminality (Early 
June, 1945), in The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record 1944–
1945, at 209, 210 (Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982); see Ryan, supra note 23, at 70. 
46 Ryan, supra note 23, at 89. 
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ple with these questions.47 They note that “international criminal tri-
bunals alone cannot bear the full burden of doing justice and stitching 
polities back together. They must be augmented by other mecha-
nisms.”48 The problem is how to do this without undercutting the 
efªcacy of the tribunals qua criminal tribunals. Hafner and King survey 
potential conºicts that arise from the “complementary roles” of inter-
national tribunals and national human rights trials, truth and recon-
ciliation commissions (TRCs), and community-based gacaca systems. 
They do this within the context of a broad vision of the responsibility of 
tribunals: tasks such as individual or political “healing” are judicial re-
sponsibilities and are appropriate for judicial institutions. Therefore, 
they argue, a proper international tribunal system requires well-
planned, carefully calibrated mechanisms able to achieve them. Their 
article offers valuable insights based on the complicated experience to 
date of attempts to interweave the international system with various 
national models. 
 More speciªcally, William J. Fenrick, in his well-focused contribu-
tion, considers the law that regulates combat activities.49 He notes that 
the basic purpose of such international humanitarian law is preven-
tive (i.e., it is designed to be applied in military training, planning, 
and operations to minimize human suffering and the destruction of 
civilian targets.) Although prosecution for violations of such law is 
uncommon, a rather substantial body of law has developed at the 
ICTY. Fenrick carefully reviews this jurisprudence and argues that it 
proves that effective prosecution for combat offences can legitimately 
and productively be conducted before “non-specialist” tribunals. 
 Finally, participants grappled with the problems of legal concepts 
that are not clearly governed by international law. Judith McMorrow, a 
leading scholar of U.S. legal ethics, considered the complex problem of 
how systems of legal ethics develop at international tribunals.50 McMor-
row provocatively views the international system as an “extraordinary 
laboratory” in which we can examine how legal cultures interact in the 
international arena.51 She carefully examines the ethical dilemmas that 
                                                                                                                      
47 Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B. L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional 
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work 
Together, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 91 (2007). 
48 Id. 
49 William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal Standards for 
Combat Activities, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 111 (2007). 
50 Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals, 30 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 139 (2007). 
51 Id. 
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arise as tribunals bring together lawyers and judges who have been 
trained in a variety of legal settings. Offering signiªcant comparative 
insights, McMorrow examines how attorney-conduct norms are created 
in the United States through such disparate mechanisms as “socializa-
tion,” malpractice law, market controls, regulatory processes, and pro-
cedural rules. She then compares this fertile (some might say messy) 
melange to the nascent legal practice community emerging at the ICTY. 
At present, she concludes, judges are the dominant source of “norm 
creation.”52 This, she suggests, is because socialization is a weak har-
monizing force, malpractice is a non-existent factor, and market con-
trols have little effect. Thus, much norm setting at the ICTY occurs 
through regulatory processes (e.g., Rules of Conduct) and procedural 
rules. But, in a conclusion that ought to have important ramiªcations, 
McMorrow suggests that the development of coherent, meaningful 
ethical norms at international courts would beneªt from more interac-
tion among the judicial, prosecutorial, and defense functions. 
 Phillip L. Weiner and Susan Somers added important voices of 
prosecutorial experience to the Symposium.53 Somers focuses on Rule 
11 bis at the ICTY, which governs the increasingly important system of 
referral of cases from the ICTY to national legal systems. This article 
forms an interesting companion to that of Hafner and King in that it 
explores exactly how such transfers take place. As Somers notes, refer-
ral helps to ensure that “lower and intermediate level” persons indicted 
by the ICTY for serious violations of international humanitarian law will 
be brought to justice before the appropriate national court, notwith-
standing the time constraints of the ICTY “Completion Strategy.”54 As 
her article indicates, many questions remain to be pondered in that 
realm, including matters of legitimacy, timing, harmonization, and 
questions of which law should be applied. 
 Weiner grapples with a rich and complex subject that exempliªes 
the importance of this Symposium: the question of a defendant’s com-
petency to stand trial. His article recounts the ªrst “competency” hear-
ing that had taken place in an international war crimes tribunal since 
Nuremberg, that of Major-General Pavle Strugar. Weiner carefully ana-
lyzes how the trial court’s decision will provide important precedent for 
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all future war crimes cases and tribunals. He notes how the Strugar deci-
sion, unlike prior competency decisions at Nuremberg and Tokyo, sets 
workable standards for determining the ªtness of an accused person to 
stand trial.55 These standards, he concludes, adequately protect both 
the rights of the accused and the interests of the prosecution.56 Thus, 
Weiner’s work exempliªes how complex problems that were not clearly 
governed by international law evolve and become reªned through the 
jurisprudence of tribunals. 
 Taken together, the articles in this Symposium exemplify how the 
developing law of the tribunals may support Robert Jackson’s aspiration 
that power ought to pay tribute to reason. The power is more diffuse 
now, the reason more nuanced, and the challenges of understanding 
the relationship between the two are more complicated. Therefore the 
work published here ranges from the most abstract considerations of 
legitimacy and the deepest reviews of history to highly detailed, techni-
cal analyses from which real law develops. As such, it constitutes a major 
contribution to the scholarly literature of modern human rights law 
and, one hopes, will help to enhance that law’s quality and to sharpen 
its cutting edge. 
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